On May 20, 2025, Donald Trump unveiled the Golden Dome, marking one of the most ambitious and contentious defense projects in US history.
The $175 billion initiative that Trump aims to implement before his term ends in January 2029 seeks to establish a comprehensive missile defense system designed to guard the United States against nuclear threats, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and advanced weaponry.
Inspired by Israel’s Iron Dome, the proposal envisions a global network of both terrestrial and space-based detectors and interceptors, enabling the destruction of enemy missiles in the atmosphere before they reach US soil.
While the administration has yet to clarify the operational details, critics argue that the concept is not only impractical but could also foster dangerous instability.
A New Era for Space
“The Golden Dome is reminiscent of a rebranded Strategic Defense Initiative,” says Dr. Michael Mulbihill, a researcher at Teesside University specializing in the geopolitical and technical ramifications of space weaponization. BBC Science Focus. “There are numerous political dynamics at play.”
The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), proposed by President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, aimed to create a US missile defense system using lasers, satellites, and other space-based technologies to intercept incoming Soviet missiles. Eventually, the project was abandoned due to concerns over its technical feasibility and astronomical costs.
Critics warn that the Golden Dome could revive similar flawed thinking, leading to severe ramifications for space security.
Although space has historically supported military operations through satellites for tracking, communication, and navigation, it hasn’t typically been viewed as a battlefield. In fact, the Outer Space Treaty explicitly prohibits the use of outer space for hostile purposes.
However, the Golden Dome might change that paradigm.
“This initiative could serve as a catalyst for the weaponization of space, prompting the development of various systems that have emerged in recent years,” warns Mulvihill.
The concern isn’t solely about US weapons in orbit; it extends to potential responses from other nations, such as Russia, raising the specter of an extensive orbital arms race.
Fueling an Arms Race
Critics like Mulvihill underscore that space-based missile shields could ultimately backfire, making the world less safe. The logic is straightforward: if one side creates a defense system capable of intercepting missiles, the opposing side is likely to retaliate by increasing its missile arsenal to overwhelm those defenses.
“This has been a consistent issue with anti-ballistic missile systems,” Mulvihill points out. “They can be overloaded, as seen in the 1960s and ’70s when both the US and USSR significantly increased their warhead counts.”
All defense systems come with inherent limitations. The Cold War taught us that the goal is often to amass enough warheads to ensure that at least some can reach their targets.
According to Mulbihill, the Golden Dome poses a risk of repeating this cycle on an even larger scale.
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Low Earth Orbit: A Crowded Space
Implementing the Golden Dome would require thousands of new satellites. This space component could involve Starlink-like megaconstellations equipped with interceptor missiles to target ICBMs during the initial launch phase.
That isn’t just ambitious—it’s hazardous.
A 2024 study published in Nature’s Sustainability estimated that there could be over 100,000 low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellites by 2034. According to NASA, there are already more than 25,000 objects greater than 10cm in size, along with approximately 500,000 smaller fragments.
Even in the absence of weapons, navigation in space is becoming increasingly challenging. The addition of thousands of military satellites could dramatically heighten the risk of collisions and debris.
“If one of these interceptors malfunctions or detonates, it doesn’t just result in the loss of a single satellite; it can render entire orbits unusable for years,” warns Mulvihill.
He provides a stark analogy: “In naval warfare, when a ship sinks, the battlefield is abandoned. In space, the debris remains, circling the Earth at incredibly high speeds.”
Is the Golden Dome Feasible?
In addition to the geopolitical and environmental concerns, the Golden Dome faces fundamental operational challenges that could hinder its effectiveness.
While it may be capable of intercepting slower threats such as drones and short-range missiles, the difficulties presented by ICBMs are significantly greater.
“Interdicting an ICBM during its boost phase is extraordinarily challenging,” says Mulvihill. “Those missiles are launched from locations that could include central China or central Russia.”
To achieve global coverage within such a limited window, a tremendous number of space-based interceptors would be necessary.
According to a February 2025 Report from the American Physical Society (APS), over 1,000 orbital weapons would be essential to intercept even North Korean ICBMs during their boost phase. For 10 missiles launched in quick succession, around 10,000 interceptors would be required.
The costs entailed would be astronomical, and vulnerability to anti-satellite attacks from countries like Russia adds another layer of complexity. Reports suggest that such developments pose severe risks.
The APS report concludes with cautionary insight: “Even relatively modest numbers of nuclear-armed ICBMs present substantial challenges for creating reliable and effective defenses.”
“An extensive review of published literature highlights that many key challenges identified in developing and deploying efficient ballistic missile defenses are likely to remain unresolved beyond the 15-year timeframe we studied.”
Not Just Another Iron Dome
While the Golden Dome draws its name and inspiration from Israel’s Iron Dome, the comparison is misleading.
“People tend to focus on the success of the Israeli Iron Dome, but we must remember that it’s designed to protect against much lower-altitude projectiles and even some handheld rockets,” asserts Mulvihill. “ICBMs operate in an entirely different arena.”
Despite the ambitious plans for the Golden Dome, Mulvihill remains doubtful about its viability as a serious defense mechanism.
“It seems more like a spectacle fueled by political motives and opportunism from the aerospace industry,” he concludes.
About Our Experts
Michael Mulbihill is a researcher at Teesside University focused on sociotechnical and astrophysical phenomena stemming from nuclear deterrence and space technology. He also serves as the deputy convener for the Military War and Security Research Group and is a member of the Space Cooperative Working Group of the British Association for International Studies.
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Source: www.sciencefocus.com
