Image captured by a Ukrainian drone during operation
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On June 1, Ukraine made headlines with a daring strike on Russian air bases. Utilizing inexpensive, compact drones concealed within trucks that had ventured deep into Russian territory, Ukraine successfully targeted numerous strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, resulting in a loss of $7 billion in military assets.
The drone swarm operation, dubbed Operation Spider-Web, showcased remarkable military strategy while also exposing the vulnerabilities that defense leaders globally may soon confront.
“Currently, there’s a 100% likelihood of a small drone assault on air bases in the US or UK,” stated Robert Bunker, a consultant for US firm C/O Futures. “A group with intention and capability is needed. This is a very modest expectation.”
The Ukrainian security service SBU reported that 117 first-person view drones were deployed in the attack, each carrying several kilograms of explosives provided by racing quadcopters. Last year, countries produced approximately 1.5 million of these drones for battlefield applications, each costing a few hundred dollars. Although they typically have a range of about 20 km, Operation Spider-Web demonstrated their capability to reach target areas and operate remotely.
The assault did not catch US defense analysts off-guard. According to Zachary Karenbourne, who authored a 2019 analysis on potential threats to strategic bombers: “Ukraine’s operation had a much broader scope and impact than I anticipated. I initially believed such an attack was merely part of a larger assault on enemy nuclear assets, but Ukraine managed to neutralize 34% of its nuclear bomber fleet with an exceptionally coordinated effort.”
What steps should nations undertake to shield themselves against comparable assaults? Generally, there are three strategies: physical barriers, electronic defenses, and kinetic measures.
The initial approach seems straightforward—erect physical defenses to deter drones. Some Russian aircraft targeted by Ukraine were stationed in bays protected by concrete blast walls or earthen berms meant to shield against ground explosions. However, these measures do not safeguard against aerial strikes. Russia is currently racing to construct hardened aircraft shelters, which are costly, running into millions and sufficiently large for fighters. There was an assumption that larger strategic bombers could forgo this protection, as they were expected to remain distant from frontlines and threats.
Anti-drone nets represent a more economical solution and have been adopted by both Ukraine and Russia in battlefield scenarios. Reportedly, Russian authorities have recommended implementing such barriers in airspace. However, following the Ukrainian strike, the challenge is that these nets can be easily dismantled.
“The net provides decent defense against initial UAS [Uncrewed Aerial System] attacks,” Bunker notes. Yet, given the low cost of drones, attackers can launch a first wave to neutralize the net before proceeding with subsequent strikes.
What about electronic defenses? Both Russia and Ukraine are currently utilizing jamming technologies to disrupt the communication between drones and their operators. While this can be effective in wartime, jammers typically function over limited ranges, necessitating comprehensive coverage of the airbase. “They need to be deployed and monitored around the clock,” Bunker indicates.
This approach has its complications. The operations of Spider-Web employed commercial mobile networks, but attackers can utilize any frequency to command the drone, so blanket jamming of all channels might not be feasible. “Jammers can disrupt friendly communications,” warns Karenbourne. “To forestall such assaults, we may have to endure increased risks to our own operations.”
Moreover, the SBU claims that the drones were designed to anticipate jamming and were outfitted with AI systems enabling them to reach their targets autonomously. Such drones are virtually impervious to jamming.
This leaves kinetic measures as a final defense. Known as shooting down drones, Russian airfields were fortified against conventional aerial attacks via surface-to-air missile systems and mobile anti-aircraft units, but these were ill-equipped to detect or engage small drones.
“A weaponry system designed for this task demands advanced acquisition and targeting capabilities to be effective against armed drones,” Bunker states. “If operated by humans, they need to be distributed strategically across the facility for defense and manned continuously.”
Auto-defense mechanisms present promising options, and Ukraine is already deploying AI-driven anti-drone machine gun turrets to safeguard cities from Russian assaults involving substantial Shahed drones. However, at an expense of around $100,000 each, these turrets can be easily surpassed by smaller, more affordable drones utilized in the Spider-Web operation. “A swarm of drones could well succeed,” Karenbourne admits.
In summary, while there is no definitive solution, militaries urgently need to discover ways to mitigate this looming threat. A recent statement from a US Air Force General to the Senate Committee noted that in 2024 alone, over 350 unauthorized drones infiltrated military installations across the United States. Moreover, American bases in the UK have reported similar drone incursions.
“While many may be hobbyists, at least some are definitely adversaries,” adds Karenbourne. These hostile drones are likely engaging in intelligence-gathering rather than attempts to strike. “If we were in a conflict with China, that might change dramatically.”
This indicates that operations akin to Spider-Web could easily be replicated, in Russia or elsewhere. “This issue extends far beyond a significant vulnerability,” Bunker concludes. “Current defenses cannot be adequately reinforced. The situation is deteriorating rapidly.”
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Source: www.newscientist.com
