Recent advancements in quantum computing have decreased the power required to breach standard encryption techniques by tenfold. With this remarkable reduction, common encryption methods face heightened vulnerability, prompting concerns about future security.

The RSA algorithm, a staple in online banking and secure communications, relies on the intricate task of factoring two large prime numbers. While the possibility of using quantum computers to bypass this challenge was theorized since the 1990s, the physical size requirements of such quantum systems previously rendered them impractical.

However, this landscape is shifting. In a groundbreaking 2019 study, Craig Gidney, from Google’s Quantum AI, outlined a method that significantly lowered this requirement from 170 million qubits to just 20 million. Furthermore, by 2025, Gidney plans to bring it down to below one million qubits. Most recently, Paul Webster and his Australian team at Iceberg Quantum cut this estimate to approximately 100,000 qubits.

Their research expands on Gidney’s algorithm improvements while incorporating a new methodology called qLDPC coding, which enhances qubit connectivity beyond immediate neighbors. This modification increases the overall information density possible in quantum systems.

Based on their findings, the team predicts that cracking a prevalent RSA encryption could become feasible within about a month using 98,000 superconducting qubits—those presently manufactured by tech giants like IBM and Google. To achieve this in just one day, a staggering 471,000 qubits would be necessary.

Some quantum computing firms aspire to develop machines with hundreds of thousands of qubits within the next decade. However, these optimistic calculations overlook material considerations and focus primarily on error rates and computational speed. What happens if the Iceberg Quantum approach is feasible? An entity controlling such a quantum computer could potentially access private emails, bank accounts, and governmental data secured via RSA encryption.

“The stringent requirements pose a significant challenge in hardware manufacturing—the toughest hurdle,” Gidney comments. Similarly, Scott Aaronson from the University of Texas at Austin expressed concerns about the practicalities of configuring connections between distant qubits on his blog here.

IBM has been an advocate for qLDPC coding recently, making strides in making its quantum hardware compatible. However, the extent of success with this methodology remains uncertain. An IBM spokesperson noted that qLDPC codes form the “foundation” of their quantum computing technology but did not elaborate on the feasibility of Iceberg’s innovations.

Facilitating connections between distant qubits is simpler when using extremely cold atoms or ions—two emerging strategies in the quantum computing arena. Yet these systems are often slower, and recent research indicates that unlocking RSA encryption may still require millions of qubits.

“It’s crucial to maintain a flexible perspective on the timeline for such breakthroughs,” states Lawrence Cohen from Iceberg Quantum. “Should RSA be compromised, the fallout could be immense. It’s better to be proactive than reactive.”

Although breaking RSA encryption is a well-researched issue, it serves as an excellent benchmark for those pursuing powerful quantum systems. Moreover, the team’s techniques might also enhance simulations of quantum materials and quantum chemistry.