By February 2026, the absence of any active treaty limiting the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russia marks a significant turning point. While opinions on the effectiveness of the New START Treaty vary, there is a consensus that a successor treaty appears improbable.

The inception of nuclear weapons limitations began with the 1991 START I treaty, which laid the groundwork for inspections and reductions, leading to the New START agreement in 2011. In 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin extended this treaty for an additional five years. However, discussions for alternatives have stalled since the February 5 deadline.

Tensions between the U.S. and Russia escalated dramatically following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Shortly thereafter, Russia excluded itself from weapons inspections, prompting U.S. retaliation. While both nations contemplate resuming nuclear testing, such discussions appear more performative than productive. The odds of a New START successor seem dimmer than ever.

Mark Bell, a professor at the University of Minnesota, indicates that the prospect of a new treaty that limits U.S. arsenals to match those of Russia is unappealing, given concerns about deterring both Russia and an increasingly assertive China. Although China has approximately 600 nuclear weapons, it is rapidly expanding its capabilities. Conversely, Russia may resist accepting any cap that allows it fewer nuclear arms than the U.S. Additionally, China is likely to oppose any deal that limits its growth toward parity with the U.S. and Russia. Bell describes these negotiations as complicated, making it a challenging starting point.

START I and New START are acknowledged as largely beneficial, providing a stabilizing effect on international relations. However, Bell expresses skepticism regarding their overall impact on global safety. “They may have saved some costs for both superpowers and fostered a collaborative forum, but I doubt they fundamentally altered the risk of war,” he notes.

Irrespective of the treaty status, the risk of nuclear conflict remains high, according to Bell. He argues that the concept of mutually assured destruction serves as a deterrent, emphasizing that it is the dire repercussions of nuclear warfare—rather than treaties—that may prevent hostilities. “This stabilizing effect derives from the inherent dangers and is a characteristic of nuclear deterrence,” he explains.

Yet, some experts voice deep concern over the end of the treaty. Steven Herzog, a scholar from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and former arms control advisor, told New Scientist that the expiration of New START will heighten the risk of nuclear conflict.

“Lack of transparency in nuclear weapons development makes the international landscape less secure, fostering unchecked competition among leaders potentially reliant on nuclear arms,” Herzog cautions. “In an era where both Russia and the U.S. appear increasingly unpredictable, the absence of critical confidence-building measures raises alarming concerns about an arms race.”

Several treaties related to nuclear weapons remain in effect, including the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which seeks to eliminate these armaments but lacks participation from nuclear-armed states. While some nuclear powers have signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it does little to restrict the actual number of weapons available. New START represented the only effective framework addressing nuclear power responsibilities.

Herzog asserts that if both Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin desired a similar agreement, a rapid consensus could be achievable. Previously, President Putin made a proposal that President Trump positively received regarding an unofficial extension. However, no formal negotiations are happening at present, and any potential agreement would likely only serve as a temporary fix.

Philip Bleek, a researcher at the Middlebury Institute, notes that persisting in negotiations could be valuable if additional time enables a new treaty’s creation. However, the long-term outlook for arms control appears grim. “A short-term extension could result in Russia feeling its participation isn’t necessary, reducing its willingness for future involvement,” advises Brig.

Negotiating treaties involves complex interactions among political figures, military branches, and intelligence communities, with potential for nabbing minor but critical strategic advantages. Herzog points out that the Trump administration has already diminished the number of essential personnel involved in inspections and negotiations.

“If we aim to pursue a new treaty seriously, our current staffing and resources may not be sufficient,” Herzog concludes.