As of February 2026, the world faces a historic moment: for the first time in decades, there will be no active treaty regulating the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia. While experts are divided over the effectiveness of the New START Treaty in enhancing global security, there’s a consensus that establishing a successor treaty is improbable.

The United States and Russia initiated their nuclear arms reduction efforts with the START I treaty in 1991, which evolved into the New START in 2011. In 2021, Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin agreed to extend the treaty by five years, but this agreement expired on February 5, 2026, and negotiations for a new treaty have stalled.

Tensions escalated significantly between the U.S. and Russia following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Shortly after, Russia was excluded from crucial weapons inspections, leading to U.S. retaliation. Currently, discussions are emerging about potential nuclear tests from both countries, though many see these as mere posturing devoid of real substance. The likelihood of a New START replacement treaty appears dimmer than ever.

Mark Bell, a professor at the University of Minnesota, argues that a new treaty limiting the U.S. arsenal to match that of Russia’s would be unattractive to the U.S. This is largely due to concerns over needing a robust deterrent against both Russia and the increasingly nuclear-capable China, which currently has 600 nuclear weapons. While this is significantly fewer than the 5,000 plus weapons possessed by the U.S. and Russia, China’s nuclear capabilities are rapidly growing. Russia is unlikely to accept any proposal that would limit its arsenal to numbers inferior to the U.S.’s, and China would resist agreements that restrict its future growth to parity with these powers. Negotiating a new treaty is fraught with complications from the outset, Bell asserts.

Historically, START I and New START are viewed as successful frameworks. Though not flawless, they have contributed to stability. However, Bell expresses skepticism regarding their true impact on global safety. He notes, “Could they have saved both superpowers some money? Perhaps. Did they provide a platform for cooperation? Certainly. But did they fundamentally alter the risk of war? I don’t think so.”

Regardless of treaty status, the threat of nuclear war persists, according to Bell. He suggests that the concept of mutually assured destruction serves as our current safeguard against nuclear conflict. “The fear of catastrophic consequences, rather than treaties, is what may deter warfare. This stabilizing factor stems from danger itself, which is an intrinsic aspect of nuclear deterrence,” he elaborates.

Conversely, some experts are more concerned about the implications of losing the treaty. Steven Herzog, a scholar at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California, and former U.S. Department of Energy arms control specialist, remarked to New Scientist that the absence of New START heightens the risk of nuclear warfare.

“A lack of transparency makes global security fragile by spurring unchecked competition among leaders who might resort to nuclear capabilities,” Herzog warns. “In an environment where Russia’s unpredictability is escalating and the U.S. administration is equally volatile, it’s alarming that we lack essential measures for confidence-building and transparency that could temper an arms race.”

Although various treaties addressing nuclear weapons exist, the ambitious Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons seeks to eliminate nuclear arms completely yet lacks participation from many nuclear-armed nations. Furthermore, while several states have ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it does little to curb the existing arsenal. New START remains the only treaty that held nuclear powers accountable.

Herzog believes that both Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin could potentially reach a similar agreement if they desired. Indeed, President Putin’s proposal for an unofficial one-year extension was positively received by President Trump. However, concrete negotiations are absent, and any such accord would likely serve as a temporary fix rather than a long-term solution.

Philip Bleek, a researcher at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, expresses that while extending the treaty could be beneficial if it allowed time for negotiating a new agreement, the long-term prospects for arms control remain bleak. “A one-year extension may lead Russia to feel their financial stake is wasted, making them less likely to engage in future talks,” he explains.

Treaty negotiations are intricate battles involving political leaders, military strategists, and intelligence officials striving for even marginal strategic advantages. Herzog notes that Russia could be at an advantage since significant personnel, such as weapons inspectors and negotiators, have been dismissed or forced out by the Trump administration.

“If we are serious about negotiating a new treaty, we likely won’t have the staffing or resources available to do so,” Herzog concludes.